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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Leotis Brannon Branigh, III, appeals from his judgment of conviction for first 
degree murder, enhanced by the use of a deadly weapon. He asserts that the district 
court erred by granting the State's motion for reconsideration and holding that the 
federal Electronic Communication Privacy Act superceded Idaho Criminal Rule 41 (a), 
erred by admitting unfairly prejudicial photographs of the victim's wounds, and erred by 
failing to conduct a Rule 404(b) analysis of text messages admitted at trial. He also 
asserts that that the prosecutor committed misconduct, rising to the level of fundamental 
error, when he argued facts not supported by the evidence during his closing argument 
and that the prosecutor violated Ms. Branigh's right to due process by failing to correct 
false testimony at trial. Finally, he asserts that the district court erred by denying his 
motion for a new trial because Mr. Branigh establish a Brady violation, and because the 
court applied the incorrect standard pursuant to I.C. § 19-2406. 
This Reply Brief addresses the State's contention that suppression is not a 
remedy for a violation of I.C.R. 41 (a) and that Mr. Branigh lacked standing to challenge 
the search and seizure of his text messages. It also addresses the State's 
mischaracterization of Mr. Branigh's Rule 404(b) claim. This Reply Brief is further 
necessary to clarify that the record in this case demonstrates that Mr. Peak provided 
false testimony at trial, which was known to be false by the prosecutor and, therefore, 
the prosecutor committed misconduct in failing to correct this testimony. Additionally, 
the prosecutor asserted facts nowhere in evidence, and beyond the scope of any 
reasonable inference from the evidence, contrary to the State's assertion. Finally, this 
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Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's contentions on appeal with regard to the 
district court's disposition of Mr. Branigh's motion for a new trial on both due process 
grounds pursuant to Brady v. Mary/and, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and on statutory grounds 
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2406. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Branigh's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but 
are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
2 
ISSUES 
1, Did the district court err by granting the State's motion for reconsideration of its 
decision that the search warrant for Mr. Branigh's cellular phone records was 
unlawfully executed? 
2. Did the district court err by admitting evidence regarding all of the text messages 
in this case because the district court failed to conduct an IRE 404(b) analysis? 
3. Did the prosecutor commit misconduct, rising to the level of fundamental error, 
when he presented argument to the jury that was not supported by evidence 
presented at trial? 
4. Did the prosecutor violate Mr. Branigh's right to due process when he failed to 
correct false testimony presented by one of the state's witnesses at trial? 
5. Did the district court err, and and deny Mr. Branigh's due process right to a fair 
trial, when it denied Mr. Branigh's motion for a new trial based upon the Brady 
violation that occurred in this case? 
6. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Branigh's motion for a new trial 
pursuant to I.e. § 19-2406 because the district court failed to apply the correct 




The District Court Erred By Granting the State's Motion For Reconsideration Of Its 
Decision That The Search Warrant For Mr. Branigh's Cellular Phone Records Was 
Unlawfully Executed 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Branigh asserts that the district court properly concluded that his cellular 
telephone records were inadmissible and erred in granting the State's motion for 
reconsideration and concluding that 18 U.S.C. 1 et. seq. expanded the scope of an 
Idaho magistrate's authority in authorizing a search warrant. Mr. Branigh contends that 
the warrants were both unlawfully obtained and unlawfully executed and, thus, the 
district court's initial decision to suppress the records obtained by the warrant was 
correct. This Reply Brief addresses the State's argument that suppression is not a 
remedy for the alleged violations in this case and that Mr. Branigh lacks standing to 
challenge the search in this case. 
B. The District Court Erred By Granting the State's Motion For Reconsideration Of 
Its Decision That The Search Warrant For Mr. Branigh's Cellular Phone Records 
Was Unlawfully Executed 
1. I.C.R.41(a) 
The State's first argument is that, assuming I.C.R. 41 (a) was violated, such a 
violation does not warrant suppression. (Respondent's Brief, p.14.) The State is 
incorrect. First, this Court should not consider the issue because it was not raised 
below and Mr. Branigh did not have an opportunity to address the State's arguments in 
the district court. Second, because I.C.R. 41 (a) serves to protect the state constitutional 
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guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures, suppression is the appropriate 
remedy, Further, because the magistrate had no jurisdiction to issue the warrant at 
issue in this case, the warrant is void. A search conducted pursuant to a void warrant is 
the equivalent of a warrantless search. And searches undertaken without a warrant and 
in the absence of a valid warrant exception are subject to suppression. 
This Court should refuse to entertain the State's argument. The State did not 
raise this claim below and, therefore, Mr. Branigh did not have the opportunity to 
address the State's claim in the district court, Very recently, in State v. Morgan, 
Idaho _, 2013 WL 275893, the Court refused to hear a claim raised by the State for 
the first time on appeal. Id. at *2. In Morgan, the defendant challenged the denial of his 
motion to suppress on appeal. The State conceded Morgan's claims, but argued for the 
first time on appeal that a Boise City Ordinance justified the stop. Id. The Court denied 
the State's motion to augment with the Ordinance on due process grounds, because 
Morgan had not had a fair opportunity to present evidence with regard to the Ordinance 
in the district court. Id. Thus, because the Ordinance was not before the Court, the 
Court did not consider the justification for the stop. Id. 
Mr. Branigh is in a similar situation here. Violations of some state statutes and 
court rules can result in suppression pursuant to the Idaho Constitution, as is set forth 
below. However, because the State did not raise this claim in the district court, 
Mr. Branigh did not have the opportunity to make an argument concerning state 
constitutional protection. Indeed, the district court initially suppressed the evidence at 
issue. (R., p.756.) When the State filed a motion for reconsideration, it did not claim 
that a violation of I.C.R. 41 (a) did not justify suppression, it argued that the Electronic 
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Communication Privacy Act permitted extra-territorial warrants. (R., p.765.) Had the 
State raised this claim in the district court, Mr. Branigh could have asserted protection 
pursuant to the Idaho Constitution. 1 Because there was no adverse ruling from the 
district court on this issue, the argument was never presented. As the only ruling from 
the district court with regard to this issue was in Mr. Branigh's favor, there was no 
reason to assert this claim initially. (See R., p.756.) The only adverse ruling by the 
district court on this issue was with regard to the Electronic Communication Privacy Act 
and, thus, that is the claim presented on appeal. 
However, if this Court does consider the State's claim, Mr. Branigh asserts that it 
should consider his claim that Idaho law requires suppression for violations of state 
statutes and court rules that protect against unreasonable searches and seizures. "This 
Court from its earliest interpretation of Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution, has held 
that the right afforded individuals to protection of their persons and homes is so 
fundamental as to require strict adherence to the constitutional and statutory 
requirements." State v. Mathews, 129 Idaho 865, 869 (1997). Thus, the Idaho 
Supreme Court has held that evidence obtained under an unsigned warrant was 
inadmissible because the warrant did not meet the requirements of I.C. §§ 19-4401, 
4406, and 4407, as well as I.C.R. 41. Id. at 870. The Court held, "failure to supply the 
signature once it is challenged will vitiate any future search under the warrant." Id. 
Later, in State v. Card, 137 Idaho 182, 187 (2002), the Idaho Supreme Court 
stated, 
1 Mr. Branigh did cite the state constitution in support of his motion; the issue was 
simply never briefed because it was not an issue in the distort court. (R., pp.306-307.) 
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the statutes relating to issuance, execution and returns of search warrants 
supplement the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches 
and seizures. Violation of the statutory scheme in this case resulted in an 
unreasonable search and seizure with respect to Card's office and home. 
Suppression of the evidence is an appropriate remedy to discourage the 
government agents from engaging in unreasonable searches and seizures 
in violation of the state constitution. See, e.g., State v. Rauch, 99 Idaho 
586, 586 P.2d 671 (1978) (evidence obtained in violation of "knock and 
announce" statute held inadmissible as protected by constitutional 
prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure). 
To be sure, not every violation of a statute or court rule will result in the suppression of 
evidence. The Idaho Supreme Court has also held that if Hle violation is just a 
procedural error, suppression will not be granted See, e. State v. Bicknell, 140 Idaho 
201, 204 (2004). The violation in this case is not merely procedural; I.C.R. 41 (a) sets 
forth the jurisdiction of the issuing court and prohibits the magistrate from issuing a 
warrant for premises outside of its judicial district. Every procedural hurdle required by 
Idaho law could have been cleared in this case and the magistrate still could not have 
issued the warrant because it was without jurisdiction to do so. A warrant issued by a 
magistrate without jurisdiction violates not just Idaho procedural rules but also the Idaho 
Constitution's prohibition against unreasonable searches. 
Finally, the fact that the warrant was issued without jurisdiction makes the 
warrant void, and the subsequent search unreasonable pursuant to both the Idaho 
Constitution and the Fourth Amendment. Purported judgments entered by a court 
without jurisdiction over the subject matter are void. See State v. Armstrong, 146 Idaho 
372, 374 (Ct. App. 2008). Idaho Courts lack jurisdiction over premises located in either 
Texas or Kansas and thus any order issued from an Idaho Court to premises out of its 
jurisdiction in violation of Idaho law is a nullity. If the warrant is considered a nullity, the 
search conducted was the equivalent of one conducted without a warrant. Warrantless 
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searches are presumptively unreasonable. State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 370 
(1989). The burden of proof rests with the State to demonstrate that the search either 
fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement or was otherwise 
reasonable under the circumstances. State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288, 290 (1995). 
Mr. Branigh's argument in this regard is straightforward: As the issuing magistrates 
lacked any authority to issue warrants outside their judicial districts, the warrants were 
unlawfully obtained. When warrants are issued by magistrates without authority, they 
are invalid warrants and thus searches conducted pursuant to those warrants are 
unreasonable under both the federal and state constitutions. 
2. Standing 
In this case, the district court concluded that Mr. Branigh had standing to 
challenge the search in this case. (Tr., p.230.) The district court was correct. As the 
State notes, the district court relied on Quon v. Arch Wireless Operation Company, 529 
F.3d 892 (9 th Cir. 2008). While the State is correct that Quon was later reversed, it was 
not reversed based on its holding regarding expectations of privacy in text messages; 
indeed, the United States Supreme Court assumed, in its order reversing, that Quon 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages that he sent. See City of 
Ontario, California v. Quon, _ U.S. _, 130 S.Ct. 2619 (2010). The United States 
Supreme Court concluded that, assuming an expectation of privacy, the search was 
reasonable. Id. at 2627-33. Thus, Mr. Branigh submits that the rationale provided by 
Quon is still persuasive. That rationale is as follows: 
In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the government placed an 
electronic listening device on a public telephone booth, which allowed the government 
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to listen to the telephone user's conversation. Id. at 348. The Supreme Court held that 
listening to the conversation through the electronic device violated the user's 
reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. at 353. In so holding, the Court reasoned, "One 
who occupies [a phone booth], shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits 
him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the 
mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world. To read the Constitution more narrowly is 
to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private 
communication." Id. at 352. Therefore, "[t]he Government's activities in electronically 
listening to and recording the petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which he 
justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a 'search and 
seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 353. 
The Ninth Circuit recognized that, "[o]n the other hand, the Court has also held 
that the government's use of a pen register-a device that records the phone numbers 
one dials-does not violate the Fourth Amendment. This is because people 'realize that 
they must 'convey' phone numbers to the telephone company, since it is through 
telephone company switching equipment that their calls are completed.'" Quon, 529 
F.3d at 904 (quoting Smith v. Mary/and, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979)). The Ninth Circuit 
noted that the Court distinguished Katz by noting that "a pen register differs significantly 
from the listening device employed in Katz, for pen registers do not acquire the contents 
of communications." Id. (citing Smith, 442 U.S. at 741.) 
The Ninth Circuit also noted that this distinction appplies to written 
communications, such as letters. The Ninth Circuit had previously held that, it is well-
settled that, "since 1878, ... the Fourth Amendment's protection against 'unreasonable 
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searches and seizures' protects a citizen against the warrantless opening of sealed 
letters and packages addressed to him in order to examine the contents." United 
States v. Choate, 576 F.2d 165, 174 (9th Cir.1978) (citing Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 
727 (1877)); see also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 
L.Ed.2d 85 (1984) ("Letters and other sealed packages are in the general class of 
effects in which the public at large has a legitimate expectation of privacy."). However, 
as with the phone numbers they dial, individuals do not enjoy a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in what they write on the outside of an envelope. See United States v. 
Hernandez, 313 F.3d 1206, 1209-10 (9th Cir. 2002) ("Although a person has a 
legitimate interest that a mailed package will not be opened and searched en route, 
there can be no reasonable expectation that postal service employees will not handle 
the package or that they will not view its exterior.") (citations omitted). 
The Ninth Circuit then moved on to its internet jurisprudence. In United States v. 
Forrester, the Ninth Circuit held that, .. e-mail ... users have no expectation of privacy in 
the to/from addresses of their messages ... because they should know that this 
information is provided to and used by Internet service providers for the specific 
purpose of directing the routing of information." United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 
500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008). Thus, the Ninth Circuit extended the pen register and outside-
of-envelope rationales to the "to/from" line of e-mails but did not rule on whether 
persons have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of e-mails. Like the 
Supreme Court in Smith, it explicitly noted that .. e-mail to/from addresses ... constitute 
addressing information and do not necessarily reveal any more about the underlying 
contents of communication than do phone numbers." Id. Thus, the Ninth Circuit 
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concluded that "[t]he privacy interests in these two forms of communication [letters and 
e-mails] are identical," and that, while "[t]he contents may deserve Fourth Amendment 
protection ... the address and of the package do not. Id. at 511. 
The Ninth Circuit has seen no meaningful difference between the e-mails at issue 
in Forrester and the text messages at issue in Quon. Both are sent from user to user 
via a service provider that stores the messages on its servers. Quon, 529 F.3d at 905. 
"Similarly, as in Forrester, we also see no meaningful distinction between text 
messages and letters. As with letters and e-mails.itis not reasonable to expect privacy 
in the information used to 'address' a text message, such as the dialing of a phone 
number to send a messages." Id. "However, users do have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the content of their text messages vis-a-vis the service provider." Id. (citing 
United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that defendant had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages on his cell phone, and that he 
consequently had standing to challenge the search)). 
In Quon, the Ninth Circuit also found that it was significant that the appellants in that 
case did not expect that Arch Wireless would monitor their text messages, much less 
turn the messages over to third parties without their consent. Id. at 906. In this case, 
Mr. Branigh submitted Sprint's Privacy Policy in support of his suppression motion. In 
the section regarding disclosure of personal information, the policy states that the 
company will only disclose personal information when release is appropriate to comply 
with the law. (R., pp.493, 500.) Such an agreement only reinforces an individual's 
expectation of privacy in his text messages. 
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Mr. Branigh does not suggest that every search or seizure of a text message 
must be done with a warrant. The party receiving the message could, by consent, 
permit the message to be read, or his phone to be seized. However, that is not what 
happened in this case. See United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 418 (C.A.A.F. 1996) 
("[T]he maker of a telephone call has a reasonable expectation that police officials will 
not intercept and listen to the conversation; however, the conversation itself is held with 
the risk that one of the participants may reveal what is said to others.") (citing Hoffa v. 
United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966)). Like a letter or a telephone conversation, a 
person runs the risk of the receiving party disclosing the letter or the content of the 
telephone call; however, that person still has a reasonable expectation that the 
authorities will not intercept the letter or listen to the conversation absent a warrant. 
Mr. Branigh had the same expectation of privacy in this case. Thus, because the 
search was of Mr. Branigh's records, not of messages received by others and then 
disclosed with their consent, Mr. Branigh has a reasonable expectation of privacy and 
thus standing to challenge the illegal search and seizure of the cellular phone records. 
Further, though not directly relevant because Mr. Branigh was challenging the 
search of the contents of his messages, he would likely have an ever greater 
expectation of privacy pursuant to the Idaho Constitution, as Idaho has rejected Smith v. 
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979), and held that installation of a pen register is a 
search. State v. Thompson, 114 Idaho 746, 748-49 (1988). Thus, Mr. Branigh asserts 
that he would have standing to challenge the search of even the "to/from" lines from his 
text messages pursuant to the Idaho Constitution. 
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II. 
The District Court Erred By ,A,dmitting Text Messages During Desiree Anderson's 
Testimony Because The District Court Failed To Conduct An IRE 404(b) Analysis 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Branigh asserts that the district court improperly admitted evidence of his text 
messages without undertaking the requisite analysis under i.R.E. 404(b) as required by 
law and by the district court's pretrial order in this case. 
B. The District Court Erred By Admitting Text Messages During Desiree Anderson's 
Testimony Because The District Court Failed To Conduct An IRE 404(b) Analysis 
Much of State's response on this issue is a mischaracterization of Mr. Branigh's 
actual appellate claim. For instance, the State devotes a subsection to I.R.E 403, and 
asserts that, "Branigh's assertion that the district court failed to analyze whether the 
'danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence' 
is plainly disproven by the record." (Respondent's Brief, p.35.) Mr. Branigh agrees that 
such a claim would indeed be disproven by the record. However, no such claim was 
made. 
The claim actually made by Mr. Branigh was that the district court erred by failing 
to conduct an IRE 404(b) analysis. See Appellant's Brief, p.35 ("[Mr. Branigh] asserts 
that the district court erred by failing to recognize that these messages, many of them 
quite prejudicial, fell within the scope of Rule 404(b) and by failing to determine their 
relevancy outside of the presence of the jury.") While Mr. Branigh did quote from IRE 
403, he did so only to cite to the entire analysis required by State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 
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(2009). In the very next sentence, however, Mr. Branigh alleged his specific claim of 
error: 
In this case, the district court did not perceive the text messages as falling 
within the scope of Rule 404(b) and, therefore, did not undertake the 
analysis required of it by Grist. Regarding Exhibit 4, Mr. Branigh objected 
on the basis of Rule 404(b). The district court stated that it had not been 
cited to anything "particular for 404(b)" and overruled the objection. 
(Tr., p.515, Ls.17-18.) The district court erred. 
(Appellant's Brief p.36.) Mr. Branigh never claimed that the district court did not conduct 
a Rule 403 analysis - he asserted that the court erred by failing to perceive that Exhibits 
4 and 64 were subject to Rule 404(b). Mr. Branigh does believe that any balancing 
regarding prejudice would be flawed where the district court does not perceive the 
evidence at issue to be other acts evidence, but this was not the claim raised and 
Mr. Branigh did not allege that the court failed to conduct a Rule 403 analysis. 
The State also asserts that the decision of the district court should be affirmed 
because Mr. Branigh did not assert which messages in Exhibits 4 and 64 fell under 
I.R.E.404(b). (Respondent's Brief, p.33.) However, it was Mr. Branigh's position in the 
district court, and it is his position on appeal, that the entirety of both exhibits fell under 
IRE 404(b). The State appears to concede as much: "In this case, the district court 
admitted the state's proferred IRE. 404(b) evidence .... " (Respondent's Brief, p.36.) 
Further, to the extent that the State is claiming that it was Mr. Branigh's burden to 
establish which specific messages fell under IRE 404(b), the State is mistaken - it is the 
State that bears the burden of establishing admissibility pursuant to IRE 404(b). See 
IRE 404(b) (providing that evidence of other acts can be admissible, "provided that the 
prosecution in a criminal case shall file and serve notice reasonably in advance of trial, 
or during the trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the 
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general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at triaL" Thus, it is 
Mr. Branigh's position that, once he objected on Rule 404(b) grounds, it was the State's 
duty to justify admissibility of the evidence and the court's duty to conduct the analysis 
of whether the evidence of prior conduct was relevant to a material and disputed issue 
other than propensity, and whether the jury could reasonably conclude that the act 
occurred and that the defendant was the actor. 
Finally, the State asserts that, pursuant to State v. Cooke, 149 Idaho 233 
(Ct. App. 2010), because the district court was not asked to articulate whether the act 
occurred and the defendant was the actor, the district court did not err. (Respondent's 
Brief, p.34.) Cooke is very different than the instant case, however. In Cooke, "the 
State made a prima facie showing that the threats were made by Cooke in Its written 
and oral offer of proof; in response to which Cooke did not to object or otherwise bring 
to the attention of the trial court any potential issue that these threats were never in fact 
made by the defendant." Id. at 240. In this case, the State made no prima facie 
showing of any kind because the district court did not perceive the evidence to be Rule 
404(b) evidence. This is not a case where, following a prima facie showing, the 
defendant does not place the issue in dispute. Mr. Branigh placed the admissibility of 
the exhibits at issue by his IRE 404(b) objection and the district court erred by failing to 
perceive the evidence as falling under Rule 404(b). 
Regarding the State's claim that any error by the district court was harmless, this 
Court should do what the Grist court did when it concluded that, "the district court did 
not determine whether there was sufficient evidence to establish as fact Grist's prior 
uncharged sexual misconduct with AW. nor did the district court articulate whether the 
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evidence was probative because it demonstrated the existence of a common scheme or 
plan or because it tended to otherwise corroborate J.M.O.'s testimony." Grist, 147 
Idaho at 53. The Grist Court did not decide the admissibility of the evidence at issue in 
the case; it remanded the case for the district court to make that determination on 
remand. As the district court here did not decide those issues, remand is appropriate 
for the district court to make that determination. 
Further, the error is not harmless. The significance of the messages contained is 
these exhibits is best illustrated by the fact that the State relies on them in its statement 
of the case in an effort to demonstrate Mr. Branigh's guilt. (Respondent's Brief, pp.2-3.) 
Many of the text messages are very inflammatory, such as statements regarding dead 
bodies in old graves, asking whether Ms. Anderson's kids were out of the house, 
statements about not fearing death, and "good bye heart of my heart," among many 
others. (Exhibit 4). Such statements would be difficult for any jury to ignore, and thus, 
Mr. Branigh asserts that the district court's error was not harmless. 
III. 
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct, Rising To The Level Of Fundamental Error, By 
Arguing Facts Not In Evidence During ClOSing Arguments 
A, Introduction 
The prosecutor, in closing arguments in this case, argued facts that were never 
placed into evidence, were not reasonable inferences from the limited evidence at trial, 
and were not within the common sense or experience of the average juror. This 
improper argument went to one of the areas of greatest doubt in the State's evidence 
against Mr. Branigh - i.e., the general lack of evidence connecting Mr. Branigh to any 
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firearm and the failure of the State to test for gunshot residue to determine whether he 
had come into contact with a firearm. Because the prosecutor's improper argument 
constituted a due process violation that was plain from the face of the record, and 
because there is a reasonable possibility that this misconduct contributed to the verdict 
in this case, this argument constitutes a fundamental error requiring reversal. 
B. The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct, Rising To The Level Of Fundamental 
Error, By Arguing Facts Not In Evidence During Closing Arguments 
The State has asserted in this appeal that the prosecutor's remarks in closing 
argument regarding facts not in evidence with regard to the failure of police to conduct 
gunshot residue tests does not amount to fundamental error. (Respondent's Brief, 
pp.41-44.) In support of this position, the State primarily asserts that the facts argued 
by the prosecutor were primarily "reasonable inferences from the evidence," and 
therefore were not improper. Mr. Branigh submits that this argument is without merit in 
light of the argument of the prosecutor and the limited evidence presented at trial. 
"Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than the law 
as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted during trial, including 
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, this impacts a defendant's 
Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010) 
(emphasis added). Accordingly, it constitutes prosecutorial misconduct for a prosecutor 
to refer to facts never placed into evidence at trial, or to otherwise seek to bolster the 
credibility of the State's evidence through implying that the prosecutor is privy to 
additional facts outside the record. See, e.g., State v. Marmentini, 152 Idaho 269, 271-
273 (Ct. App. 2011); State v. Gerardo, 147 Idaho 22, 26-27 (Ct. App. 2009); State v. 
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Martinez, 136 Idaho 1, 525-526 (2001); State v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6, 14 (Ct. App. 
1995) (prosecutor did not commit misconduct where prosecutor did "not imply that he 
was privy to information corroborating the witnesses' testimony that was unknown to the 
jury, or that he was personally vouching for the credibility of his witnesses"). 
The sole statement proffered into evidence by Detective Birdsell by way of 
explanation for the lack of gunshot residue testing on Mr. Branigh's person or effects 
was a single statement that, "[o]ur state lab doesn't test gun powder residue, so, no, 
they were not." (Tr., p.781, Ls.20-24.) The detective did not testify that the lab did, at 
one point, do such testing but then ceased the practice, as was suggested by the 
prosecutor in closing arguments. (Tr., p.1023, L.25 - p.1024, L.17.) But, more 
important for this Court, none of the evidence at trial subsumed the following "facts," 
each of which were alleged by the State in closing arguments. 
There was no evidence at trial that would indicate: (1) that the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation ceased the practice of testing items for gunshot residue because such 
tests are unreliable; (2) the degree to which gunshot residue tests have been 
determined to result in "a false positive" result; (3) whether gunshot residue tests could 
determine how recently an individual has had contact with a firearm; (4) whether 
gunshot residue tests could indicate the type of firearm used or touched by a person; (5) 
the length of time it would have taken to have results returned on DNA testing, had any 
been done of the blood found at the scene; (6) the likelihood of transfer of gunshot 
residue from one source to another; and (7) whether all of the police officers' weapons 
would have gunshot residue that could be transferred to Mr. Branigh. Yet, each of 
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these "facts" was attested to by the prosecutor during closing arguments. (Tr., p.1023, 
L.25-p.1024, L.17, p.1040, Ls.7-22.) 
Nor could these assertions of fact be inferred from Detective Birdsell's statement 
that gunshot residue tests were not performed at the state lab. The mere fact that one 
lab does not perform a certain form of forensic testing does not, of itself, provide any 
information regarding the efficacy or reliability of that test. Numerous other factors 
most notably economic ones could playa role in determining what type of testing is 
offered at any given facility. Accordingly, the State's argument that the prosecutor's 
remarks in closing argument were merely inferences from the testimony presented at 
trial is without merit. 
Additionally, each of the above-noted assertions levied by the prosecutor in 
closing arguments is beyond the ken of an average jurors' common sense awareness. 
Each of these claims was rooted in a specialized awareness of the forensic efficacy and 
limitations of gunshot residue testing, which is generally a matter of scientific, technical, 
or other specialized knowledge. See I.R.E. 702; Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 148-
149 (Ct. App. 2006) (remanding for an appointment of a forensic pathologist within post-
conviction action to assist, inter alia, with interpretation of gunshot residue evidence). 
Given that the matters asserted by the prosecutor in closing arguments subsume 
matters that fall within the realm expert testimony, these assertions are not merely 
"common sense observations," as claimed by the State on appeal. 
Finally, the trial court's instruction to the jurors that they should follow their own 
memory of the evidence if it differed from that presented by the attorneys is not availing 
here, where the prosecutor was arguing facts to the jury that were never admitted into 
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evidence, so that the jury had no other source of information to compare with the 
prosecutor's assertions. A prosecutor is not permitted to bolster the credibility of the 
evidence or to rely on the implication of the existence of additional evidence, not 
presented to the jury, to which only he or she has access in order to seek to sustain a 
prosecution. Priest, 128 Idaho at 14. 
Moreover, Mr. Branigh's questions of Detective Birdsell regarding the absence of 
any testing for gunshot residue were directed at one of the greatest weaknesses in the 
State's case the general absence of evidence connecting him to any firearm. In this 
case, no shell casings were found either the scene of Mr. Johnston's shooting or in 
Mr. Branigh's car. (Tr., p.733, Ls.12-16, p.740, Ls.6-9.) Likewise, police did not find a 
gun on Mr. Branigh's person or within his car at the time of his arrest. (Tr., p.740, LS.6-
9.) Mr. Branigh's questions regarding the failure to test his person or clothes for 
gunshot residue likewise highlighted the absence of any proof that would tend to show 
he had any recent contact with a gun. In light of the overall weakness in the State's 
evidence with regard to this issue, there is a reasonable possibility that the prosecutor's 
improper presentation of facts outside the evidentiary record regarding the forensic 
efficacy of gunshot residue tests contributed to the jury's verdict in this case. 
IV. 
The Prosecutor Violated Mr. Branigh's Right To Due Process When The Prosecutor 
Failed To Correct False Testimony Presented By One Of The State's Witnesses At Trial 
A. Introduction 
Contrary to the State's assertions on appeal, the record in this case 
demonstrates that the prosecutor was aware, prior to the time of Mr. Branigh's trial, of 
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the inappropriate relationship between Mr. Peak and Sheriff Dorion; and that the 
prosecutor failed to take corrective action when Mr. Peak mischaracterized the nature of 
this relationship during cross-examination at trial. There was no other evidence at trial 
that would tend to inform the jury of the nature and extent of this relationship. 
Accordingly, Mr. Branigh asserts that the prosecutor violated his right to due process 
when he failed to correct Mr. Peak's false testimony at trial, and that the prejudice of this 
violation requires reversal. 
B. The Prosecutor Violated Mr. Branigh's Right To Due Process When The 
Prosecutor Failed To Correct False Testimony Presented By One Of The State's 
Witnesses At Trial 
With regard to Mr. Branigh's allegation that the prosecutor committed misconduct 
by failing to correct false testimony from Steven Peak regarding the nature of his 
relationship with then-Sheriff Jim Dorion, the State first argues that the testimony 
tendered by Mr. Peak on this issue was equivocal, and therefore not clearly false. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.49-51.) Mr. Branigh submits that, when the line of questioning 
that he attempted to pursue on this issue is viewed in context, the State's contention is 
not supported by the record. 
The State has attempted to cast Mr. Branigh's questions of Mr. Peak as being 
limited to merely the question of how Mr. Peak first came to meet Sheriff Dorion, as 
opposed to the nature and extent of the relationship between these two men. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.50-51.) This is not accurate. Although Mr. Branigh was not 
privy to the same information as the prosecutor with regard to the extent of the 
relationship between Sheriff Dorion and Mr. Peak, it is apparent that Mr. Branigh was 
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attempting to cross-examine Mr. Peak as to the nature of this relationship not merely 
about how the two first met. 
Prior asking him directly about his relationship with Sheriff Dorion, Mr. Branigh 
questioned Mr. Peak about whether he had ever made representations that his girlfriend 
had a close relationship with the sheriff, such that Mr. Peak could make use of this 
relationship if he were ever in trouble with the law. (Tr., p.890, Ls.11-22.) Mr. Peak 
denied this, and then characterized his girlfriend's relationship with Sheriff Dorion as 
one of acquaintance. (Tr., p.890, Ls.11-22.) When asked how Mr. Peak was himself 
acquainted with the sheriff, Mr. Peak responded solely that, "[Sheriff Dorion] was a 
resource officer at my high schooL" (Tr., p.890, L.24 - p.891, L.2.) 
Mr. Branigh's question was not when Mr. Peak first came to meet the sheriff, but 
was rather a general query as to the nature of the relationship between these two 
individuals. And, as was acknowledged by Mr. Peak himself in subsequent 
proceedings, the answer provided by Mr. Peak failed to accurately disclose the extent of 
this relationship. (Supp Tr., p.80, L.16 - p.81, L.9.) Accordingly, the State's 
interpretation of this question as being one limited to the inception, rather than the 
scope, of the relationship between Mr. Peak and Sheriff Dorion is not borne out by a 
review of the record at trial. 
In addition, the State characterizes this false testimony as one dealing with a 
mere inconsistency within the evidence presented at trial, relying on the Ninth Circuit 
decision in United States v. Geston, 299 F.3d 1130, 1135 (2002). The State cites the 
Geston opinion for the proposition that inconsistent evidence, standing alone, does not 
22 
constitute evidence of false testimony for purposes of establishing a Napue2 violation. 
(Respondent's Brief, p.51.) The State's reliance on this case is misplaced, however, 
because the Geston case involved two sets of inconsistent facts that were both 
presented to the jury at trial. Geston, 299 F.3d at 1134-1135. The Geston court merely 
held that it was for the jury to resolve the two disparate sets of facts presented within 
the witnesses' testimony. Id. Here, however, the jury never heard any alternate 
accounting or characterization of the relationship between Mr. Peak and Sheriff Dorion. 
Accordingly, the jury in this case never had the opportunity to weigh in its credibility 
assessrnent the substantial evidence that Mr. Peak had a close, personal relationship 
with a member of law enforcement that could have facilitated Mr. Peak's access to 
police records regarding Mr. Branigh's case. 
The State further argues that the record does not disclose that the prosecutor 
knew, at the time of Mr. Peak's testimony, that it was false with regard to Mr. Peak's 
representations of the nature of his relationship with Sheriff Dorion. (Respondent's 
Brief, pp.51-52.) This claim is likewise not borne out by the record, as it was the 
prosecutor himself who approached federal agents well before Mr. Branigh's trial with 
his concerns regarding the inappropriate relationship between Sheriff Dorion and 
Mr. Peak. Mr. Peak testified at Mr. Branigh's trial on December 11, 2008. (Tr., p.870, 
L.1 - p.873, L.13.) But this same prosecutor approached federal agents specifically 
with regards to the inappropriate relationship between Sheriff Dorion and Mr. Peak on 
November 26, 2007 - over one year prior to the testimony at issue in this appeal. 
(Supp. Ex., p.11.) 
2 Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959). 
23 
At this meeting with Agent Douglas Hart of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
the prosecutor in this case and another police officer conveyed to the agent that there 
were concerns that, as an incident to his relationship with the sheriff, Mr. Peak was 
given unauthorized access to law enforcement records. (Supp. Ex., pp.11-12.) In 
addition, the prosecutor in this case relayed that he was personally informed by "a 
number of people" about the "close, personal relationship" between Mr, Peak and 
Sheriff Dorion. (Supp Ex., p.12.) The prosecutor also conveyed that he had received 
information personally about Mr. Peak's access to the law enforcement database used 
by the Lewiston Police Department. (Supp. Ex., p.12.) Other law enforcement officers 
also approached the prosecutor, prior to his meeting with the FBI agent, about the 
inappropriate relationship and unauthorized access to information that Sheriff Dorion 
shared with Mr. Peak. (Supp. Ex., p.12.) In fact, the prosecutor in this case credited 
this information to such an extent that he agreed with Agent Hart that the appropriate 
course of action was to contact the Idaho Attorney General's Office and officially 
request that the office look into the matter for potential prosecution. (Supp. Ex., p.13.) 
Moreover, the State's argument overlooks the unchallenged findings of the 
district court with regard to when the prosecutor in this case came to be aware of the 
improper relationship between Mr. Peak and Sheriff Dorion. In the court's order denying 
Mr. Branigh's motion for a new trial, the district court found: 
The information provided to the prosecutor was more than general talk or 
opinions of uncertain reliability. It was instead attributable to specific law 
enforcement sources about specific activities and was provided in support 
of an existing and ongoing investigation. By the time the Branigh trial 
commenced, the prosecutor knew the relationship between Peak and 
Dorion was such that Peak could have accessed confidential police 
information through Spillman or from Dorion. At the very least, the 
prosecutor had direct information from law enforcement officers regarding 
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the Peak/Dorion relationship and knew an investigation was being 
conducted by the FBI, Idaho State Police and the Lewiston City Police 
Department. 
(Supp. R., p.476 (emphasis added).) 
The State has not challenged the district court's findings that the prosecutor 
knew as of the time that Mr. Branigh's trial commenced about the close relationship 
between Mr. Peak and Sheriff Dorion, and the unauthorized access to police information 
that Mr. Peak obtained as a result of this relationship. 
The standard for establishing a Napue violation requires a showing that the 
prosecutor either knew, or should known, that the testimony at issue was false. 
See State v. Wheeler, 149 Idaho 364, 368 (Ct. App. 2010) (emphasis added). 
Mr. Branigh submits that the record on appeal demonstrates that the prosecutor in this 
case actually knew that Mr. Peak was rendering false testimony when he testified that 
the extent of his relationship with Sheriff Dorion was that the sheriff was merely a 
resource officer at Mr. Peak's school. However, given the extent of the information that 
the prosecutor in this case was privy to long before Mr. Peak's trial, as well as the 
gravity of concern the prosecutor expressed regarding the relationship between 
Mr. Peak and Sheriff Dorion when the prosecutor met with an agent of the FBI, the 
record demonstrates that - at the very least - the prosecutor should have known that 
Mr. Peak's testimony at trial was false. 
Finally, for the reasons set forth more fully in the Appellant's Brief, Mr. Branigh 
submits that there is a reasonable likelihood that the false testimony tendered by 
Mr. Peak could have affected the jury's verdict in this case. See Sivak v. State, 134 
Idaho 641, 649 (2000), (see also Appellant's Brief, pp.46-47). 
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V. 
The District Court Erred, And Denied Mr. Branigh's Due Process Right To A Fair Trial, 
When It Denied Mr. Branigh's Motion For A New Trial Based Upon The Brady Violation 
That Occurred In This Case 
A. Introduction 
In response to Mr. Branigh's claim of error in the district court's denial of his 
motion for a new trial based upon the alleged Brady violation, the State primarily 
responds that, because the district court analyzed materiality and prejudice under the 
Drapeau3 test for the statutory right to a new trial, the Brady test was met. 
Underpinning the State's claim is the assertion that the second and third prongs of the 
Drapeau test are the legal equivalent of the Brady test for materiality. This assertion is 
in direct conflict with United States Supreme Court precedent directly on point. Unlike 
the second prong of the Drapeau test, evidence can form the basis of a Brady violation 
even if it is relevant solely for its impeachment value. More important for this Court, the 
United States Supreme Court has rejected the notion that the materiality test under 
Brady requires a showing of a probability of an acquittal - which is the threshold test for 
prejudice under Drapeau. Accordingly, even if this Court were to consider the district 
court's analysis of materiality and prejudice under the trial court's Drapeau analysis, this 
would still show error, as the tests are legally incompatible. 
The State further responds that the district court did not improperly engage in an 
analysis of the legal sufficiency of the remaining evidence when it evaluated the 
3 State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 785 (1976). 
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materiality of the evidence wrongfully suppressed by the State. Mr. Branigh asserts that 
this claim is not sustained by a review of the district court's ruling in this case. 
B. The District Court Erred, And Denied Mr. Branigh's Due Process Right To A Fair 
Trial, When The Court Denied Mr. Branigh's Motion For A New Trial Based Upon 
The Brady Violation That Occurred In This Case 
Mr. Branigh sought a new trial in this case based upon an alleged violation by the 
State of the requirement to disclose material, exculpatory evidence pursuant to Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). On appeal, he has asserted that the district court erred 
in denying his motion on the basis of the alleged Brady violation. The sale issue 
disputed by the State with regard to this claim of error is whether the information that 
the State failed to disclose was material to Mr. Branigh's case, thus warranting reversal. 
In seeking to sustain the district court's ruling, the State first asks this court to 
ignore the fact that the district court initially found all three prongs of the Brady test to 
have been met, and then further seeks to transpose the district court's conclusions 
regarding the statutory test for a new trial under I.C. § 19-2406(7) in place of the 
findings actually made by the district court regarding the alleged Brady violation. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.58-64.) This Court should reject the State's suggestion, as the 
test for materiality under Brady is expressly not the same test as that used under 
I.C. § 19-2406(7) for whether a new trial is warranted. 
From the outset, an initial clarification is necessary based upon the State's 
argument on appeal. The State has asserted that, "the second and third requirements 
for granting a motion for a new trial under Drapeau4 (i.e., (2) the evidence is material, 
4 The standards referenced by the State emerge from the Idaho Supreme Court Opinion 
in State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 690-692 (1976). These standards apply to motions 
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not merely cumulative or impeaching, and (3) it will probably produce an acquittal) are 
equivalent to the "reasonable probability" materiality standard of Brady." (Respondent's 
Brief, p.59 n.29; see also p.63.) This is incorrect on both counts. 
Beginning with the second prong of the Drapeau test, which governs the 
statutory right to a new trial, the strictures of Brady nowhere require that the evidence at 
issue be, "material, not merely cumulative or impeaching." See State v. Drapeau, 97 
Idaho 685, 691 (1976). In fact, the Brady standards hold the opposite. The United 
States Supreme Court in both Giglio v. United States and United States v. Bagley held 
that the requirements of disclosure under Brady apply with equal force to evidence that 
is purely relevant for impeachment. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-155 
(1972); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675-677 (1985). Impeachment 
evidence, for purposes of the due process requirement of disclosure by the State, is 
'''evidence favorable to an accused,' so that, if disclosed and used effectively, it may 
make the difference between conviction and acquittal." Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676 
(internal citations omitted). Accordingly, a Brady violation - unlike a claim raised under 
the Drapeau test for a new trial - may lie even where the evidence at issue has use at 
trial for purely impeachment purposes. 
But even more problematic, in terms of the State's conflation of the Brady and 
Drapeau tests, is the difference in the legal standards for the materiality of the violation. 
Under Drapeau, a defendant must show that the newly discovered evidence "will 
probably produce an acquittal," in order to be entitled to a new trial under I.C. § 19-
seeking a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence pursuant to the statutory 
grounds enumerated in I.C. § 19-2406(7). See State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 72 
(2011 ). 
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2406(7). Drapeau, 97 Idaho at 691. This standard has been expressly rejected as the 
test for materiality under Brady by the United States Supreme Court. 
In Kyles v. Whitley, the Court expounded upon what is, and is not, required in 
order to meet the test of materiality for an alleged Brady violation, following in the wake 
of the Court's prior Opinion in Bagley. The Kyles Court held: 
Bagley's touchstone of materiality is "a reasonable probability" of a 
different result, and the adjective is important. The question is not 
whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a 
different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he 
received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of 
confidence. A "reasonable probability" of a different result is accordingly 
shown when the government's evidentiary suppression "undermines 
confidence in the outcome of the triaL" 
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis 
added). 
Accordingly, the U.S. Supreme Court has expressly rejected the State's claim in 
this appeal that the test for materiality under Brady is that imposed under Drapeau -
i.e., that there is a probability that the evidence at issue would produce an acquittal. 
It is because the test for materiality under Brady and Drapeau are entirely 
different that the State's claim is unavailing when the State asserts that the district court 
performed the required analysis as to materiality under Brady. In each of the instances 
provided by the State in its claim that the district court performed the correct materiality 
analysis, the district court was by its own evaluation actually evaluating the legal 
standards for the ordering of a new trial under Drapeau. (Respondent's Brief, pp.59-
64.) Even if this Court were to treat the district court's analysis of whether Mr. Branigh 
was entitled to a new trial under I.C. § 19-2406(7) as though it were the court's 
evaluation of Mr. Branigh's claim of a Brady violation, the district court would still have 
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applied the incorrect analysis to the question of whether the evidence suppressed by 
the State was material. 
The State's second claim, that the district court was not improperly applying a 
sufficiency of the evidence test for the issue of materiality, is likewise not supported by 
the record. The State denies that the district court's ruling - again with regard to the 
standards articulated under Drapeau for statutory motions for a new trial - was based 
on an interpretation of the materiality standard that would subsume an analysis of 
whether the remaining evidence would have been sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.60-61.) However, the same quote taken from the district court's 
ruling that is relied upon by the State reveals this not to be the case. After canvassing 
the evidence presented by the State at trial, the district court ruled: 
When the testimony of Stephen Peak is set aside, the remaining evidence 
presented by the State was more than sufficient for the jury to have 
reached a verdict of guilty. Therefore, while the Court finds the 
withholding of impeachment evidence a violation of Brady and its progeny, 
the Court is unable to find the evidence would have likely resulted in an 
acquittal had the evidence been disclosed prior to trial. 
(Supp. R., pp.480-481 (emphasis added).) 
The district court's analysis of the sufficiency of the remaining evidence, aside 
from Mr. Peak's testimony, to support the verdict is linked by the connector, "therefore," 
to the district court's subsequent finding that the evidence would not likely have resulted 
in an acquittal. Put differently, the district court was finding that the evidence would not 
likely have produced an acquittal on the basis of its finding that a jury could have still 
voted to convict Mr. Branigh of first degree murder under the remaining evidence. This 
demonstrates the district court's belief that the prejudice test to be applied was one 
rooted in whether the remaining evidence was sufficient to convict. 
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This conclusion is further bolstered by the district court's ruling on Mr. 8mnigh's 
motion for reconsideration. There, after being alerted to the fact that the wrong 
standard of materiality was applied to Mr. Branigh's Brady claim, the district court held: 
Defendant Branigh contends the Court failed to apply the 'reasonable 
probability standard that newly discovered evidence would have changed 
the outcome of the jury's verdict, instead wrongly applying the standard 
that the newly discovered evidence would have probably produced an 
acquittal. The Court respectfully disagrees with Defendant Branigh's 
reading of the Court's Opinion. The Court addressed the newly 
discovered evidence utilizing the 'reasonable probability' standard, as is 
clearly noted at page 12 of the Court's opinion. The Court, after careful 
review and as stated in its earlier opinion, remains of opinion that 
if testimony Peak was completely removed from the 
record, the remaining evidence is clearly sufficient support the 
jury's verdict. In other words, the withheld evidence cannot be found 
undermine confidence in the verdict. 
(Supp. R., p.519 (emphasis added).) 
Two things are of note in this ruling, both of which demonstrate that the district 
court was of the erroneous belief that the prejudice test for the Brady violation in this 
case looks to the sufficiency of the remaining evidence. First, the district court's 
remarks about the sufficiency of the remaining evidence to support the verdict in this 
case were rendered directly in the context of Mr. Branigh's challenge to the district 
court's failure to apply the correct standard of materiality. The State's suggestion that 
the sufficiency analysis was not proffered by the court to support its finding that 
materiality had not been established begs the question - to what end was the court 
directing these remarks? It is apparent from the context of the court's remarks that the 
trial court was applying this analysis of the remaining sufficiency of the evidence to its 
earlier referenced "reasonable probability" standard. 
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But an even more express indication that the district court was conflating a 
reasonable probability of a different result with the sufficiency of the remaining evidence 
to support a verdict of guilt can be found in the last paragraph. Immediately after 
analyzing the sufficiency of the remaining evidence, the district court stated, "In other 
words, the withheld evidence cannot be said to undermine confidence in the verdict." 
(Supp. R., p.519 (emphasis added).) The district court was expressly equating its 
analysis of the sufficiency of the remaining evidence with the materiality standard 
required under Brady. 
The United States Supreme Court expressly rejected that these two standards 
are correlated. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434-435. Although the district court at times 
employed the language of a "reasonable possibility" of a different outcome within its 
analysis, the key issue for this Court is not whether the trial court recited the correct 
terms, but whether the district court correctly understood the meaning behind the terms 
defining the materiality standard. The record discloses this not to be the case. 
Accordingly, Mr. Branigh respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's 
order denying his motion for a new trial and remand this case for further proceedings. 
VI. 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Branigh's Motion For A New Trial Pursuant 
To I.C. § 19-2406 Because The District Court Failed To Apply The Correct Legal 
Standards To This Claim 
A. Introduction 
There is no dispute in this case that Mr. Branigh also raised a motion for a new 
trial under the statutory grounds provided for under I.C. § 19-2406(7). On appeal, 
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Mr. Branigh has alleged that the district court applied the incorrect legal standards in 
resolving this motion. The State has alleged that this Court should review his claim 
under the standards for unpreserved error as set forth in Perry. Because the district 
court actually decided Mr. Branigh's motion seeking a new trial, and because 
Mr. Branigh's claim is properly subsumed as a challenge to this ruling as an abuse of 
discretion for failing to follow the correct legal standards, the State's argument is without 
merit. 
B. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Branigh's Motion For A New Trial 
Pursuant To I.C. § 19-2406 Because The District Court Failed To Apply The 
Correct Legal Standards To This Claim 
Mr. Branigh has asserted on appeal that the district court erred, and thereby 
abused its discretion, by applying incorrect legal standards to his statutory claim for a 
new trial. The State's primary response is that this Court should review this claim for 
fundamental error, despite the fact that the core dispute in this case is whether the 
district court applied the correct legal standards. (Respondent's Brief, pp.65-72.) 
Mr. Branigh submits that the State's claim is without merit.5 
The trial court's decision regarding a motion for a new trial is reviewed by this 
Court for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., State v. A/marez, _ Idaho _, _ 
P.3d_, 2012 WL 1948499, *19 (2012)6; State v. Egersdorf, 126 Idaho 684, 687 
(1995). This Court routinely reviews claims of an abuse of discretion for whether the 
5 While Mr. Branigh continues to assert that the district court in this case applied the 
incorrect legal standards to his motion for a new trial pursuant to I.C. § 19-2406, he will 
rely upon the arguments contained within his Appellant's Brief, and will not reiterate 
those arguments herein. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.52-57.) 
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district court applied the correct legal standards in reaching its result. See, e.g., State v. 
Seiber, 117 Idaho 637,639-640 (Ct. App. 19S9); State v. Lawrence, 112 Idaho 149, 153 
(Ct. App. 1986). It is only where an issue has not been argued and decided to a trial 
court that the three-part test for fundamental error from Perry applies to this Court's 
review of the claim. Perry, 150 Idaho at 224-227. 
Mr. Branigh's claim that the district court abused its discretion in applying the 
incorrect legal standards to its adjudication of his motion for a new trial pursuant to 
I.C. § 19-2406 is properly preserved and before this Court. There is no dispute, and the 
State concedes in its Respondent's Brief, that Mr. Branigh raised claims of both a due 
process violation pursuant to Brady, and further alleged he was entitled to a new trial 
under the statutory grounds articulated in I.C. 19-2406 and case law interpreting this 
provision. Supp. R., pp.202-20S; Respondent's Brief, p.54 n.26.) Therefore, the 
issue of whether the district court abused its discretion by applying the wrong legal 
standards to the adjudication of this claim is properly before this Court and review for 
fundamental error is inapposite under these facts. 
This conclusion is further strengthened by the Idaho Court of Appeals' decision in 
Lawrence, which found an abuse of discretion and remanded the defendant's case 
based upon the district court's failure to apply the same legal standard that Mr. Branigh 
has urged in this appeal. Lawrence, 112 Idaho at 151-154. In Lawrence, as here, the 
district court was presented with evidence that showed that one of the witnesses at trial 
recanted his prior trial testimony. Id. at 151. However, at the time of the district court's 
6 The Idaho Supreme Court Opinion in Almarez has not yet been released for 
publication in the permanent law reports as of the writing of this Reply Brief, and 
therefore may be subject to revision or withdrawal. 
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ruling, the Idaho Supreme Court had not yet issued its Opinion in State v. Scroggins, 
which modified the legal test for the statutory right to a new trial where the newly 
discovered evidence subsumed recantation of trial testimony. Id. at 152-153. Although 
none of the parties before the trial court argued for a different standard of review based 
upon newly discovered evidence of the recantation, the Lawrence court did not hold that 
the legal standards from Scroggins did not apply. Instead, the Lawrence court held that 
the standards from Scroggins controlled based upon the fact that these standards were 
part of the legal standards applicable to the district court's exercise of discretion. Id. As 
noted by the Lawrence court, "When a judge exercises a discretionary function, such as 
ruling on a motion for a new trial, and in so doing he applies an incorrect legal standard, 
the proper appellate response is to vacate the ruling and remand the case for 
reconsideration." Id. at 153. 
In this case, the district court failed to apply the correct legal standard in its 
determination of Mr. Branigh's motion for a new trial. Accordingly, the district court 
abused its discretion in adjudicating this motion. As such, Mr. Branigh asks that this 
Court reverse the district court's order denying his motion for a new trial and remand 
this case for further proceedings. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Branigh requests that his judgment of conviction be vacated and his case 
remanded for further proceedings. Alternatively, he requests that the district court's 
order denying his motion for a new trial be reversed and his case remanded for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this 20th day of February, 2012. 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
36 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 20th day of February, 2012, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF, by causing to be placed a 
copy thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to: 
LEOTIS BRANNON BRANIGH III 
INMATE #42023 
IMSI 
PO BOX 51 
BOISE ID 83707 
JEFF M BRUDIE 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
CHARLES E KOVIS 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CRIMINAL DIVISION 
P.O. BOX 83720 
BOISE, ID 83720-0010 
Hand delivered to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court. 
EVAN A. SMITH 
Administrative Assistant 
JMC/eas 
37 
